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Karky: An Issue of Invocability

AN ISSUE OF INVOCABILITY
OF PROVISIONS OF THE WTO
COVERED AGREEMENTS BEFORE
DOMESTIC COURTS

RAMESH KARKY*

I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Nepal had applied to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), predecessor of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in May
1989. After the successful completion of accession negotiations, on
September 11, 2003 the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the WTO in
Cancun, Mexico agreed by consensus on the text of the protocol for
Nepal’s entry into the WTO. After Nepal’s ratification of the Protocol of
Accession, Nepal has become the WTO’s 147th member on April 23,
2004. Nepal also has become the first least-developed country1 to join
the WTO through a full working party negotiation. Nepal’s entry into
the WTO has brought many-fold legal issues which are required to be
addressed sooner or later.

* Post-doctoral Associate at the University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law, Canada;
S. J. D., Golden Gate University School of Law, U. S. A.; LL. M., Vrije Universiteit Brussel,
Belgium; Diplome in Law, Tribhuvan University, Nepal. The author would like to thank Prof. Mark
Perry and the University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law for the Postdoctoral Fellowship.
1. Out of the forty-eight least-developed countries (LDCs), thirty were original Members of
the WTO (previously GATT Contracting Parties). Now, thirty-one LDCs are members of the WTO
and twelve others—Afghanistan, Bhutan, Comoros, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Laos PDR, Liberia,
Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, Vanuatu and Yemen—are currently in the process of
accession to the WTO. The remaining LDCs, Eritrea, Kiribati, Somalia and Tuvalu, are currently
not in the process of acceding to the WTO. Understanding the WTO: Least-developed countries,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm
(last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
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The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (hereinafter
referred to as the “WTO Agreement”)2 provides that one of the principle
functions of the WTO is the administration of the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, which is set
out in Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement. The Dispute Settlement Body
(hereinafter referred to as the “DSB”) administers the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (hereinafter
referred to as the “Dispute Settlement Understanding” or “DSU”).3 The
WTO General Council, in a specialized role under a separate chair, acts
as the Dispute Settlement Body.4 The Dispute Settlement Understanding
regulates dispute settlement under all covered WTO Agreements. “The
DSB has the authority to establish panels, and to adopt panel and
appellate body reports.”5 The Dispute Settlement Understanding states
that the dispute settlement system “is a central element in providing
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.”6
The dispute settlement system of the WTO Agreement is available only
to the Member states. However, many times the root cause of the dispute
brought by a Member state to the DSB is the interest of an individual or a
company.7
Historically, many nation-states have brought cases against other nationstates in the international plane on behalf of their citizens under the right
of diplomatic protection. In theory an un-redressed wrong to an alien is
considered as a wrongful act to his state and international responsibility
arises in such a situation.8 The injured national may ask his government
to espouse his claim. If the claim is espoused by a state, it becomes an
international claim. The states concerned might elect to submit the claim
to the International Court of Justice, to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal or to a
special regime of arbitral tribunals established by the two states to hear
2. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
3. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S.
401 [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding].
4. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS:
CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT, 258 (3rd ed. 2002).
5. Dispute Settlement Understanding, art. 2, ¶ 1.
6. Id. at art. 3, ¶ 2.
7. For example, a member state can impose safeguards (quotas or tariffs) under the
Agreement on Safeguards to save its domestic industry from serious injury caused by high
importation of certain goods and any concerned member state may bring a complaint against another
member state at the DSB for such issues. It is important to note that in this context that the final
beneficiary of the WTO system is often individuals or companies.
8. See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS,
680 (third ed. 1993).
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all outstanding claims by nationals of one against the other.9 Generally a
state may not espouse a claim based on injury inflicted on its national by
another state unless its national has first exhausted all administrative and
judicial remedies available in the defendant state.10 The rationale for this
prerequisite is to give the allegedly responsible state an opportunity to
remedy the wrong under its own domestic institutions before the claim
can be elevated to the international plane.
However, the practice with the GATT and WTO with respect to the
exhaustion of local remedies is different than the normal rule of general
international law practice. The doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies
by private parties does not apply under the GATT rule.11 Although
GATT and the WTO Agreements are state to state agreements, it is
different than other international treaties. It involves products and
services and not private parties as such. However, there are private party
interests in the WTO obligations.12 The International Law Commission's
draft report on State Responsibility also supports this point of view.13
The WTO Agreements have some provisions which are directly
applicable to private parties.14 “Arguably, a Member should not be able
to complain that another is denying substantive rights if that other
Member provides the required procedural channels for the enforcement
and redress of those substantive rights and the relief afforded by these
channels has not been utilized by those complaining of the substantive
issue.”15
Hence, a system of invoking provisions of the WTO Agreements before
domestic courts may be a good starting point to the DSB system because
it will help to reduce the burden of certain types of cases on the
international plane. A study on whether provisions of the WTO
Agreements are invocable to the court of Member States under the WTO
Agreements and national laws is valuable and contributes to the WTO
system. In this context the writer has chosen Nepal and its laws for
reference besides the laws of other countries are in the proper place.
Nepal has become a member of the WTO. Hence, a serious question has
already come to mind for many lawyers and judges in Nepal whether and
9. Id. at 691.
10. Id. at 693.
11. DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 35 (Cambridge Univ. Press
2004) (1999).
12. See supra note 11, at p. 35.
13.
See supra note 11, at p. 35.
14.
See supra note 11, at p. 30.
15.
See supra note 11, at p. 35.
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if so to what extent after Nepal’s accession to the WTO, any citizen or
company of Nepal or any foreigner will be able to invoke any provision
of the Uruguay Round Agreements before the Courts of Nepal?
This paper examines and covers relevant provisions of the Uruguay
Round Agreements and laws of Nepal, provides arguments favoring and
opposing invocability and non-invocability, analyzes the constitutionality
and validity of Nepal’s accession to the WTO, the direct applicability of
the Uruguay Round Agreements in Nepal’s internal law, and the
invocability of the provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreements before
the courts of Nepal, and finally draws conclusion on the issue.
II. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF NEPALESE LAWS AND THE
WTO AGREEMENTS
Paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal,
1990,16 (hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”) states: “this
Constitution is the fundamental law of Nepal and all laws inconsistent
with it shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.” Paragraph 1
of Article 126 of the Constitution further states: “The ratification of,
accession to, acceptance of or approval of treaties or agreements to
which Nepal or the Government of Nepal is to become a party shall be as
determined by law.” Likewise, Paragraph 3 of Article 126 of the
Constitution states: “after the commencement of this Constitution, unless
a treaty or agreement is ratified, acceded to, accepted or approved in
accordance with this Article, it shall not be binding on the Government
of Nepal or Nepal.”
Regarding the provisions of invocability of treaty before the courts of
Nepal, there is not any explicit provision in the laws of Nepal. However,
the Nepal Treaty Act, 1990 has a provision on applicability of treaty
provision. Section 9 (1) of the Nepal Treaty Act, 1990 stipulates that “in
case the provision of a treaty conflicts with the provisions of current
laws, the latter shall be held invalid to the extent of such conflict for the
purpose of that treaty, and the provisions of that treaty shall be applicable
in that connection as Nepal laws.”
16. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF NEPAL 2047 (1990), HIS
MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT, MINISTRY OF LAW, JUSTICE & PARLIAMENTARY
AFFAIRS, LAW BOOKS MANAGEMENT BOARD, BABAR MAHAL, KATHMANDU, NEPAL
(hereinafter “CONSTITUTION”). Please note that this Constitution is no more valid and new
Constitution has not been drafted finally yet. However, aforementioned provisions of this
Constitution were valid during Nepal’s accession process. Furthermore, these provisions are the
basic provision of any Constitution and will have such provisions in the forthcoming Constitution of
Nepal. Hence, still this provision has relevancy in analyzing the provision of invocability of WTO
agreement before domestic courts.
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Article XVI: 4 of the WTO Agreement stipulates that “Each Member
shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative
procedures with its obligations as provided in the Annexed Agreements.”
However, neither WTO law nor general international law requires
countries to fully incorporate WTO law into their domestic laws and
make precise and unconditional WTO rules directly applicable to
domestic courts and citizens.17
The WTO Agreements include a large number of requirements in order
to strengthen domestic judicial review and access to justice at the
national level. Article X:1 of the GATT stipulates that “laws, regulations,
judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application, made
effective by any contracting party, …shall be published promptly.”
Likewise Article X:3 of the GATT stipulates that “(a) Each contracting
party shall administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all
its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings…., (b) Each contracting party
shall maintain, or institute as soon as practicable, judicial, arbitral or
administrative tribunals or procedures for… prompt review … .”
Article 13 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
GATT 1994 states that “Each Member … shall maintain judicial, arbitral
or administrative tribunals or procedures for … the prompt review ….”
Article 23 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
also has same kind of provision: “Each Member … shall maintain
judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for … the
prompt review ….” Likewise Article 41:1 of the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights stipulates that “Members
shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this part are
available under their law….” and Article 42 of the same Agreement
stipulates that “Members shall make available to right holders civil
judicial procedures concerning the enforcement of any intellectual
property right covered by this Agreement….”
As the WTO Agreements include numerous precise and
unconditional guarantees of private rights, such as the
intellectual property rights protected in the TRIPS Agreement
and the large number of guarantees of private access to domestic
courts, these provisions obviously raise this question: if a
Member State does not maintain these provisions in their laws,
can anybody request the court of that Member State to invoke
17. ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 244 – 245 (1997).
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one of these provisions of the WTO Agreements and decide the
case accordingly?

III. ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF INVOCABILITY OF PROVISIONS
OF THE WTO AGREEMENTS
The WTO Agreement is made and signed by the Sovereign Member
States: it is a kind of international law and thus is binding to its parties.
International law asserts legal primacy over domestic law, as illustrated
by Article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,18
and requires its performance in good faith.19 The European Union Law is
also a treaty-made law which in many respects is directly applicable and
invocable in the courts of Member States of the European Community.
The example of European Union law shows the possibility of invocation
of treaty law in the domestic court.
Besides the European Union law, there are other examples of invocation
of international law before a national court, i.e., Paquete Habana case20,
Filartiga case.21 Countries like Germany and Switzerland recognize
directly applicability and enforceability of the TRIPS Agreement in
domestic courts.22 Furthermore, an individual may sue potential
suppliers directly in national courts under the Agreement on Government
Procurement.23 By these precedents, the chances of the invocability of
the provisions of the WTO Agreements before the domestic courts of
Nepal appear high.
IV. ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF NON-INVOCABILITY OF
PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENTS
Equality among States and consent of the State is the basis of
international law. The WTO Agreements do not expressly state that the
provisions of the WTO Agreements shall have statute like effect and be
invocable before the court of Member State. Although WTO Agreements
are created by Sovereign Member States, they do not have the nature of

18. See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U. N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, (1969)
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Art. 27 states: “party may not invoke the provisions of its internal
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”
19.
See id. art. 26. See PETERSMANN supra note 17 at p. 22.
20.
See the Paquete Habana Case, Supreme Court of the United States, 1900, 175 U. S. 677,
20 S. Ct. 290, 44 L. Ed. 320;
21.
See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1980, 630
F.2nd 876.
22.
See PETERSMANN supra note 17, p. 21.
23.
See Piet Eechout, The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting
Legal Systems, 34 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 11 (1997).
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supranational law like European Union law. Different treaties may have
different implications.
There is a major distinction between treaty and statutory law. A treaty is
a contract between states whereas a statute is enacted by a state
legislature. Moreover, generally a statute shall be effective indefinitely
until it is modified or repealed. The major distinction between a treaty
and statute is that statutes intend to regulate society while treaties affect
primarily international relationships.24
“The essence of the legislative authority is to enact laws, in other words, to
prescribe rules for the regulation of the society. The objects of treaties are
contracts with foreign nations, which have the force of law, derived from
the obligations of good faith. They are not rules prescribed by the
Sovereign to the subject, but agreement between Sovereigns.”25 Hence, a
treaty cannot automatically give direct effect (statute-like) to the law of its
parties. However, the parties of the treaty have responsibility to fulfill its
obligations. A party to a treaty may fulfill its obligation in many ways. One
such way is the ‘act of transformation’ of treaty provisions into domestic
law. In this case, treaty provisions are incorporated into domestic law
through amendment or enactment of law by a law-making body of the party
State and are invocable before domestic court as a domestic law. Hence, no
argument suggests direct applicability and invocability of the WTO
Agreements before domestic law and domestic court.
V.

DISCUSSION

The laws of each Member country produce different roles for treaties in
its domestic legal system. Article XVI: 4 of the WTO Agreement states
that each Member country shall ensure the conformity of its laws,
regulation and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided
in the Annexed Agreements. This gives rise to the question of whether
any citizen or company of Nepal or any foreigner would be able to
invoke any provisions of the WTO Agreements before the Courts of
Nepal. To answer this question, we need to examine the following three
sub-issues:

24. FLORENCE ELLINWOOD ALLEN, THE TREATY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
LEGISLATION 3 (1952).
25. See id. p. 5
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CONSTITUTIONALITY AND VALIDITY OF NEPAL’S ACCESSION TO
WTO

“Accession” means the international act, so named, whereby a state
establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a
treaty.”26 “Accession occurs when a state which did not sign a treaty,
already signed by other states, formally accepts its provision.”27 Subparagraph 1(a) of Art. 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
defines treaty as “an international agreement concluded between States
in written form and governed by international law….” “Treaties are a
principal source of obligation in international law. The term ‘treaty’ is
used generally to cover the binding agreements between subjects of
international law that are governed by international law. In addition to
the term ‘treaty,’ a number of other appellations are used to apply to
international agreements.”28 Hence, a Protocol of Accession to the WTO
is a binding document as a treaty once an acceding country ratifies it.
The power to accept the treaty is significant in determining whether a
nation is bound by a treaty as a matter of international law.29 A treaty
that is valid and binding under international law may nevertheless be
invalid under the constitutional law of the participants.30 With respect to
Nepal’s accession to the WTO, the Protocol of Accession is finally made
ready by the Working Party and approved by the Fifth Ministerial
Council on September 11, 2003. The remaining final stage of the
accession, i.e., the ratification of the Protocol of Accession also is
completed by Nepal. If the process of accession were to become invalid
under international law or national law, there would not be any
possibility of invoking the WTO Agreements before the courts of Nepal.
Hence the question of constitutionality and validity of Nepal's accession
to the WTO is directly related to the question of the invocability of the
WTO Agreements before the court of Nepal.
In accordance with the Nepal Treaty Act, 1990,31 the Nepal Government
may issue full powers (letter of authority) empowering anyone to
negotiate or accept or sign a treaty. In the case of any treaty relating to
26. See Vienna Convention, supra note 18, art. 2, para. 1(b).
27. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 607 (4th ed.
1990).
28. See HENKIN ET AL, supra note 8, at P. 416.
29. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO:
INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 336 (2000).
30. See Vienna Convention, supra note 18, art. 46 stipulates that “A State may not invoke the
fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its
internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that
violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.”
31. See The Nepal Treaty Act, section 2(b) and section 3 (1990) (Nepal).
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the acquisition of membership to any such organization, or of any treaty
that conflicts with any current law, Nepal or the Nepal Government may
not become a party until a resolution is passed by the Parliament for
ratification or accession.32
Clause (1) of Article 126 of the Constitution 33 states that the ratification
of, accession to, acceptance of or approval of treaties or agreements to
which Nepal or the Nepal Government is to become a party shall be as
determined by law. Accordingly, Nepal Treaty Act, 1990 has been
enacted by Nepal. The important aspect of Clause (1) of Article 126 of
the Constitution is that the law only can determine the procedural aspects
of ratification of or accession to treaties to which Nepal becomes party.
In other words, with respect to the treaty making, Parliament is not
authorized by the Constitution to enact any such laws which will have
substantive effect.
Clause (2) of the Constitution states:
“The laws to be made pursuant to clause (1) shall, inter alia,
require that the ratification of, accession to, acceptance of or
approval of treaties or agreements on the following subjects be
done by a majority of two-thirds of the members present at a
joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament:
(a) peace and friendship;
(b) defense and strategic alliance;
(c) boundaries of Nepal; and
(d) natural resources, and the distribution of their uses:
Provided that out of the treaties and agreements referred to in
sub-clauses (a) and (b), if any treaty or agreement is of an
ordinary nature, which does not affect the nation extensively,
seriously or in the long term, the ratification of, accession to,
acceptance of or approval of such treaty or agreement may be
done at a meeting of the House of Representatives by a simple
majority of the members present.”

32.
33.

See id. section 4, para 4.
See CONSTITUTION, supra note 16.
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Unless a treaty or agreement is ratified or acceded to, in accordance with
Article 126, it shall not be binding on the Nepal Government or Nepal.34
The Constitution prohibits the conclusion of any treaty or agreement
which is detrimental to the territorial integrity of Nepal.35
In Nepal, the ratification process is described by the Nepal Treaty Act,
1990. In accordance with the Nepal Treaty Act, 1990, Nepal government
should table a resolution for ratification at the House of Representatives.
The resolution concerning the accession must be passed by a majority of
the Members present in the House of Representatives.36 Hence, as a rule,
Nepal had to ratify the Protocol of Accession from the House of
Representatives (Parliament) and informed the WTO. Thirty days after the
ratification, Nepal would become a member of the WTO. Instead of thirty
days, Nepal got six months time, i.e., March 31, 2004 to ratify the Protocol.
The House of Representatives was dissolved by the last elected
Prime Minister in Nepal in 2002 and the date for election was
not scheduled yet. In such circumstances, Nepal had only two
options, either to request with the WTO for the extension of
ratification periods of time or to ratify the Protocol of Accession
in accordance with the existing legal and constitutional frame
work. In the absence of the House of Representatives, the
legislative power including the treaty making power still exists
with Nepal as a sovereign nation, and Nepal can ratify this
Protocol of Accession accordingly.
Nepal could request with the WTO for the extension of periods of time
for ratification until the formation of the next House of Representatives.
The WTO General Council has power to extend such periods of time.37
But there was not certainty of formation of next House of
Representatives within the extended period of time due to the uncertain
existing political environment. Hence, this option was not logical.
Finally, the Government of Nepal decided to ratify the protocol of
accession in accordance with the existing legal and constitutional
framework. Accordingly, the Government decided to amend the Nepal
Treaties Act, 1990 to pave the way for the ratification of the Protocol of
Accession. The Cabinet (Council of Ministers) decided to add a new
34.
See CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, art. 126, cl. 3.
35. See CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, art. 126, cl. 4.
36. See Nepal Treaty Act, section 4 (1990) (Nepal).
37. The WTO General Council has already exercised this power in the case of Cambodia's
accession on 11 February 2004 and it agreed to give another six months to ratify its membership
agreement. See http//www.wto.org/English/news_e/news04_e/gc_Cambodia_11feb04_e.htm (visited
2/17/2004).
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clause in Article 4 of the Nepal Treaty Act, 1990 through Royal
Ordinance38 that will delegate the Government the authority to ratify
international agreements. The clause has also made a provision for the
present arrangement to be automatically annulled once there is an elected
parliament.39 After the issuance of Ordinance, the Government endorsed
Nepal’s membership to the WTO.40 The Nepalese Cabinet forwarded the
decision to ratify the WTO membership to the Head of the State on the
third week of March, 2004 as per the Nepalese Treaties Ordinance, a law
drawn into effect for the purpose. The newly added clause in the
erstwhile Nepal Treaty Act, 1990 provides for the King’s approval
mandate for the country to become the member of the multilateral
organization when the Parliament is absent to do so.41 The Nepalese
domestic ratification process completed on March 23, 2004 after the
King granted Royal Assent to the said Cabinet decision.42 This has
resolved the constitutional deadlock, which could have cost Nepal its
hard won WTO membership.43
On March 25, 2004 the WTO accepted the submission of ratification by
Nepal and announced “Nepal will become the 147th Member of the WTO
on 23 April 2004. Nepal will be the first least-developed country to join
the WTO through the full working party negotiation process.”44 Finally,
38. See CONSTITUTION, art. 72(1). It provides that His Majesty’s shall have a power to
issue Royal Ordinance when the House of Representatives is not setting/working.
39. See KANTIPUR ONLINE. 2004-03-13;
see http://www.kantipuronline.com/php/kolnews.php?&nid=9035 (visited on 3/16/2004).
40. See the Kathmandu Post, March 24, 2004; see http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/
2004/mar/arc_mar04_27.htm#3 (visited on 3/24/2004).
41. See March E-news letter on Globalization and WTO (2004) [SAWTEE FORUM], Vol. I,
Issue 13, March 2004.
42. See the Kathmandu Post, March 24, 2004; see http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/
2004/mar/arc_mar04_27.htm#3 (visited on 3/24/2004).
43. In connection to the constitutionality of the ratification, Prachand Man Shrestha, Head of
the WTO Cell at the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, says “Our constitution has a provision for
making laws in absence of the House of Representatives and we have done so in the past 14 years.
In case of WTO, if we are required to join it within a certain deadline, we can bring the ordinance
accordingly. But we have been cautious enough not to hamper the democratic system. If the House
of Representatives, after it comes into being, finds that the WTO package was not the right deal, it
can still take action. The ratification had to be done through the amendment because we have the 31
March deadline. If we fail to do so, we will be putting our country’s credibility at stake.” “Despite
the provision in the Treaty Act, we could not get the ratification done through the House of
Representatives because it is not there right now. But we are running out of time for ratification.
After intensive discussion with legal professionals, we decided to make the amendment in the Treaty
Act through ordinance so that ratification is possible. The additional clause in the Act will be
applicable only in case international organizations join, which have to be multilateral and that means
only the WTO. The amendment also has a mandatory provision that we notify the House of
Representatives within seven days of its formation about the changes made. If dates for elections are
announced, this provision will be null and void. That is how we have tried to maintain the spirit of
the Act and the Constitution.” See NEPALI TIMES, #189, 26 March – 1 April 2004,
http://www.nepalitimes.com/issue189/economy.htm (visited on 3/29/2004).
44. See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/al_nepal_e.htm (visited 3/25/2004).
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again the WTO announces “Nepal, on 23 April 2004, became the 147th
Member of the World Trade organization.”45 This landmark decision of
both the WTO and Nepal in connection to Nepal’s accession makes all
Nepalese proud to become a member of such a prestigious and truly
international organization. So the answer to the question regarding the
constitutionality and validity of Nepal’s accession to the WTO allows us
to consider other proposed sub-issues.
B.

DIRECT APPLICABILITY OF THE WTO AGREEMENTS IN NEPAL’S
INTERNAL LAW

“Direct application” means that the international treaty instrument has a
“direct” statute-like role in the domestic legal system. “Direct
application” is very similar to “self-executing.” There is distinction
between “direct application” and “invocability.” There will be no
possibility of invoking a treaty provision before the domestic court when
there is no provision of direct applicability of the treaty provision.
Invocability is possible only if there is provision of direct applicability in
the domestic law. When an international treaty is not directly applicable
in the domestic law system, it requires an “act of transformation,” that is,
a government action by that state incorporating the treaty norm into its
domestic law. Sometimes this may be called implementation of a treaty
norm. Even if a treaty norm does not prevail as a matter of domestic
law, it will likely still be “in force” as a matter of international legal
obligation. Furthermore, it can have certain “internal effects” other than
“statute-like direct application.”46
Traditionally, a “monist” State’s legal system is considered to include
international treaties as a domestic law. Consequently, a citizen of other
treaty parties can sue as an individual in the courts of that country. In
contrast, in the “dualist” state, international treaties are considered as a
separate legal system. Therefore, a treaty is not part of the domestic law
and hence an alien only has recourse to persuade his own government to
use diplomatic means to encourage another State to honor its
obligation.47 Keeping these systems and concepts in mind, we need to
examine the Nepalese Constitution and law to determine the nature of its
system.
There is no explicit provision of monist or dualist system under the laws
of Nepal. Paragraph 1 of Section 9 of the Nepal Treaty Act, 1990,
45. See http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news04_e/wto_147members_23apr04_e.htm (visited
on 4/23/2004).
46. See JACKSON, supra note 29, p. 332.
47. See id. at p. 334
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provides that in case the provisions to which Nepal has become a party
following its accession conflict with the provisions of current laws, the
latter shall be held invalid to the extent of such conflict for the purpose of
that treaty, and the provision of the treaty shall be applicable in that
connection as Nepal law. This provision of law is not enough to conclude
that Nepal is a monist state. The Constitution is the fundamental law of
Nepal and all laws inconsistent with it are deemed void.48 However, the
Constitution says nothing about the direct applicability of a treaty and
has a provision stating that the accession to treaties to which Nepal is to
become a party shall be as determined by law.49 The Nepal Treaty Act,
1990, is not empowered to address more than procedural matters relating
to how an accession process should be concluded.
The direct application of treaties is only one of a series of legal
constitutional issues relating to treaties and national legal systems.50 The
practice of various WTO Member States towards direct application of the
Uruguay Round Agreements helps us to understand the true nature of the
Uruguay Round Agreements.
The European Court of Justice has stated in the Kupferberg case 51 that
“…in order to reply to the question on the direct effect52 of the first
paragraph of Article 21 of the Agreement between the Community and
Portugal it is necessary to analyze the provision in light of both the
object and purpose of the Agreement and its context. The purpose of the
Agreement is to create a system of free trade …. As such, this provision
may be applied by a court and thus produce direct effects throughout the
Community.” But in the International Fruit case,53 the European Court
of Justice concluded that GATT Article XI did not have direct effect
because of various loopholes in GATT. In the Portuguese Republic
case,54 the European Court of Justice has stated:
“… The agreement establishing the WTO, including the annexes,
is still founded, like GATT, on the principle of negotiations with
a view to ‘entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
48. See CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, art. 1.
49. See CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, art. 126, cl. 1.
50. See JACKSON, supra note 29, p. 335.
51. See HAUPTZOLLAMT MAINZ v. C. A. KUPFERBERG & CIE., Case 104/81, [1982]
ECR 3641,at 3665.
52. In the European Law context, direct effect is understood as a provision of a treaty that can
be invoked before the Courts of Member States.
53. See INTERNATIONAL FRUIT CO. v. PRODUKTSCHAP, Cases 21-24/72, [1972] ECR
1219, 1227-1228.
54. See PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC v. COUNCIL, Case C-149/96, [1998] ECR I-7379, paras.
36-48.
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arrangements’ and is thus distinguished, from the viewpoint of
the Community and non-member countries which introduce a
certain asymmetry of obligations, or create special relations of
integration with the Community… some of the contracting
parties have concluded from the subject-matter and purpose of
the WTO Agreements that they are not among the rules
applicable by their judicial organs when reviewing the legality of
their rules of domestic law… having regard to their nature and
structure, the WTO Agreements are not in principle among the
rules in the light of which the Court is to review the legality of
measures adopted by the Community institutions.”

Under United States jurisprudence, some treaties can be found to be selfexecuting, in which case they will be directly applied. United States
courts have ruled that a directly applied treaty has the same status as
federal laws (statutes, etc.) and that the latest in time therefore prevails.
Thus, for internal law purposes, a later United States statute will prevail
over the international agreement.55 “Regarding the Uruguay Round
Agreements, it is not self-executing and thus has no direct “statute-like”
effect in United States law, although the agreements can and should have
an indirect effect on United States courts and offices when they interpret
provisions of United States law.”56 In the Suramerica de Aleaciones
case,57 the Court concluded that if there is a direct conflict between a
United States statute and the GATT, the statute controls and the GATT
does not trump domestic legislation.
During the Uruguay Round negotiation, Switzerland initiated to require
each GATT member to give the GATT direct effect, or some equivalent
status, in its national law.58 This initiation was not included in the final
Uruguay Round Agreements and it indicates that the GATT members as
a whole still do not desire direct effect for the GATT. In fact, the WTO
Dispute Settlement Panel, in the US-Section 301-310 of the Trade Act
1974 case,59 concluded that neither the GATT nor the WTO has so far
been interpreted by GATT/WTO institutions as a legal order producing
direct effect.

55. See JACKSON, supra note 29, at p. 341.
56. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 4, at p. 244.
57. See Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C. A. v. United States, 966 F. 2nd 660, 667-668
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
58. See Kuijper, The New WTO Dispute Settlement System – The Impact on the European
Community, 29 Journal of World Trade 49 (No. 6), 1995 at 65.
59. See UNITED STATES-SECTION 301-310 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974,
WT/DS152/R, Panel Report adopted by the DSB on January 27, 2000.
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These illustrations make clear that a provision of the WTO Agreements
cannot be applied directly as domestic law in Nepal. This is because the
WTO Agreements have no nature of direct applicability in domestic law
and there are no practices of direct applicability in domestic law among
various major states. The laws of Nepal also do not provide for the
direct applicability of such treaties in domestic law.
C.

INVOCABILITY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENTS
BEFORE THE COURTS OF NEPAL

Paragraph (1) of Section 9 of the Nepal Treaty Act, 1990, states: “… in
case the provisions of a treaty conflict the provision of current laws, the
latter shall be held invalid to the extent of such conflict for the purpose of
that treaty, and the provisions of the treaty shall be applicable in that
connection as Nepal laws.” As discussed above, Paragraph (1) of
Section 9 of the Treaty Act, 1990, is not compatible with clause (1) of
Article 126 of the Constitution and is subject to being voided under
Article 1 of the Constitution if any body challenges this law before court.
Hence, we cannot state only on the basis of the said provision of the
Nepal Treaty Act, 1990, that there is provision of direct applicability in
the laws of Nepal. There will be no possibility of invoking a treaty
provision in the domestic court when there is no provision of direct
applicability of treaty provision. Invocability is possible only if there is
provision of direct applicability. Besides this, the said provision of the
Nepal Treaty Act, 1990, does not state that a treaty provision will be
invocable before the courts of Nepal. Even on the basis of Nepal Treaty
Act, 1990, we can say that a provision of a treaty is not invocable before
the courts of Nepal. Concerning direct application, the treaty must be
valid both internationally and domestically, it must be applied directly,
and it must be invocable.60 Hence, we can say that provisions of the
WTO Agreements are not invocable before the courts of Nepal under
prevailing laws.
The context, object and purpose61 of the WTO Agreements also do not
give the meaning of direct application in national law and invocability
before a domestic court, because they do not create absolutely binding
obligations, but reciprocity and mutually advantageous arrangements.
Other major countries’ practices also help us to understand the issue of
the invocability of the WTO Agreements. In the United States, no
person (except the United States itself) has a cause of action or defense
60.
61.

See JACKSON, supra note 29, at p. 339.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 18, art 31, para. 1.
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under any Uruguay Round Agreement and no person may challenge a
federal, state or local law or action or inaction on the grounds that it is
inconsistent with the Uruguay Round Agreements.62
In Japan, in the so-called Necktie case,63 the district court’s decision to
not allow invocation of a GATT provision was affirmed by the Japanese
Supreme Court. The European Community has also not given effect of
invocability (we call it direct effect in EU context) with respect to the
WTO Agreements.64 Hence, other major WTO Member countries'
practices, the nature of the Agreement, and laws of Nepal support the
view that provisions of the WTO Agreements cannot be invoked before
the courts of Nepal.
VI. CONCLUSION
On the basis of the analysis of the above-mentioned sub-issues, we can
draw an opinion
that the very nature of the WTO Agreements is
founded on the principle of negotiations with a view to entering into
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements but not on certain
obligations like the European Union. It is not a supranational law or
agreement.
The context, object and purpose of the WTO Agreements do not hint at
direct applicability in domestic law and invocability before the court of
Member States. Other major member countries also have not given
direct applicability of the WTO Agreements to their domestic laws and
accordingly not allowed the invocation of provisions of the WTO
Agreements before their domestic courts. Even a Panel of the Dispute
Settlement of the WTO (adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body) has
stated in a case65 that the WTO Agreements will have no direct effect (no
invocability).
The Nepal Treaty Act, 1990, also does not provide for the invocability of
treaty provision before the courts of Nepal. Therefore, no person,
company, or any foreigner can invoke any provision of the WTO
Agreements before the courts of Nepal. However, in the future, if the
House of Representatives (Parliament of Nepal) passes an implementing
law that provides for the invocability of WTO Agreements before the
courts of Nepal, the WTO Agreements may be invoked before the courts
of Nepal.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See The Uruguay Round Agreement Act, section 102(c), (1994) (U. S. A.).
See JACKSON, supra note 29 at p. 358.
See supra note 53 & 54.
See supra note 59.
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